Compact Online Reference Encyclopedia (CORE)

Looking for information on a specific topic, training, rule, or process? Through one search here, you can find the information you need from ICAOS’ white papers, advisory opinions, bylaws, policies, Hearing Officer's Guide, training modules, rules, helpdesk articles and the bench book. All results are cross-referenced with links to make navigation easy and intuitive.

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Bench Book - 1.2.3 Compacts Are Not Administrative Agreements
Compacts differ from administrative agreements in two principal ways. First, states, as sovereigns, have inherent authority to enact Compacts. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838). Thus, states do not need any express…
Bench Book - 1.3 Delegation of State Authority to an Interstate Commission
One of the axioms of modern government is a state legislature’s ability to delegate rulemaking power to an administrative body. This delegation of authority extends to the creation of an interstate commission through an interstate Compact. See Hess v.…
Bench Book - 1.4 Congressional Consent Requirement
The ICAOS operates under Congress’ consent in the Crime Control Act of 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
Bench Book - 1.4.1 When Consent is Required
The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution states, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Though a strict reading of the Compact Clause…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.3 No Supervisor Liability under Section 1983
In general, Section 1983 liability will not be predicated solely on a theory of respondeat superior. For example, a chief probation officer or other supervisor or manager will not automatically be deemed vicariously liable simply because he or she sits…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.4 No Substitute for Appeal or Habeas Corpus
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court clarified that a Section 1983 action should not be used to challenge the validity of a criminal judgment. If the alleged civil rights violation would be one that would render a conviction,…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.5 Official Capacity versus Individual Capacity
Plaintiffs can bring Section 1983 actions against defendants in their official capacity or in their individual capacity. Defendants sued in their official capacity will generally be immune from suits for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.6 Persons Acting under Color of Law
There is rarely any doubt in the case law that probation and parole officials are “persons” and that, in performing their duties, they are acting under “color of law” within the meaning of Section 1983. The law also allows suits against municipalities and…
Bench Book - 5.2.2 State Tort Claims
In addition to civil rights lawsuits, offenders (and others) sometimes file tort claims related to conduct arising under the Compact. In many cases some form of immunity will apply, and questions related to immunity will generally turn on the state law of…
Bench Book - 5.2.2.1 Tort Claims by Offenders
Offenders will sometimes allege that officers were negligent in carrying out their duties under the Compact. For example, in Grayson v. Kansas, No. 06-2375-KHV, 2007 WL 1259990, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2007), a probationer transferred under the Compact…
Bench Book - 5.2.2.2 Tort Claims by Others
An unfortunate fact pattern that arises from time to time is when a Compact offender causes the injury or death of a victim. Victims of those incidents (or their family members or estate) will sometimes raise tort claims against correctional or judicial…
Bench Book - 5.2.3 Claims under the Compact Itself
Some federal statutes have their own enforcement mechanism through an express or implied cause of action in the federal statute itself. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (applying the test through which a court determines whether a statute…
Bench Book - 5.3 Immunity and Related Defenses
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government may not be sued without its consent. The concept flows from the common-law notion that the “the king can do no wrong” and that a lawsuit could not be brought against him in his own courts. Through…
Bench Book - 5.3.1 Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.1 Official Capacity versus Individual Capacity
Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state government officers and employees to the extent that they are sued in their official capacity, but not to suits against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between official-capacity and…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.2 No Protection for Local Governments
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to the political subdivisions of a state (its municipalities and counties) or to the officers and employees of those subdivisions. Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Those…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.3 Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
There are several ways a state might waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. First, immunity can be waived by express state law. It can also be waived by voluntary participation in a federal program that expressly conditions…
Bench Book - 5.3.2 State Sovereign Immunity
State sovereign immunity is, as noted above, the doctrine that prevents a state from being sued in its own courts without its consent. It will generally be a matter of state law, and of course not every state is the same. Many states have narrowed or…
Bench Book - 5.3.3 Immunity in Another State's Courts
Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor other formulations of sovereign immunity bar a suit against a state in the courts of another state. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Mianecki v. Second Judicial Court of Washoe County, 658 P.2d 422 (Nev. 1983),…
Bench Book - 5.3.4 Judicial Immunity
Judges have absolute immunity from liability as long as they are performing a judicial act and there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). A judge is not deprived of absolute immunity from liability for…
Bench Book - 5.3.5 Prosecutorial Immunity
Like judges, prosecutors have absolute immunity from lawsuits seeking money damages. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1986). That immunity allows prosecutors to exercise the independence of judgment essential to their work—and to avoid the deluge of…
Bench Book - 5.3.6 Qualified Immunity
Government officials sued in their individual capacity have what is known as qualified immunity from suits for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person…
Bench Book - 5.3.7 The Public Duty Doctrine
Some states recognize the so-called public duty doctrine—the idea that a government official has no legal duty to protect an individual citizen from harm caused by a third person. The rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and a refusal…
Bench Book - 3.4 Supervision in the Receiving State
Supervision in the Receiving State
Bench Book - 3.4.1 Duration of Supervision
In interpreting the ICAOS and its rules, eligibility to transfer supervision is controlled by the nature of the offense, the nature of the sentence and the status of the offender, not the duration of supervision (as distinguished from the amount of…
Bench Book - 3.4.2 Type of Supervision in Receiving State
While the sending state has sole authority to determine the duration of supervision either by way of the court’s sentence of by paroling authorities, the receiving state retains discretion as to the type of supervision it will provide. Rule 4.101…
Bench Book - 3.4.2.1 Disabled Offenders
A receiving state is obligated to continue to supervise offenders “who become mentally ill or exhibit signs of mental illness or who develop a physical disability while supervised in the receiving state.” See Rule 2.108. Therefore, it would be…
Bench Book - 3.4.2.2 Continuing Jurisdiction over Offenders Between the Sending & Receiving States
Transferring an offender’s supervision pursuant to the Compact does not deprive the sending state of jurisdiction over the offender, unless it is clear from the record that the sending state intended to relinquish jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v.…
Bench Book - 3.5 Other Considerations
Other Considerations
Bench Book - 3.5.1 Post-Transfer Change of the Underlying Circumstances
As discussed, the transfer of supervision of an offender is mandatory in some circumstances. Receiving states are required to accept transfer if the offender is eligible under Rules 3.101 and 3.101-1. As discussed in Chapter 4 regarding return of…
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