Transferring an offender’s supervision pursuant to the Compact does not deprive the sending state of jurisdiction over the offender, unless it is clear from the record that the sending state intended to relinquish jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Virginia, 676 S.E.2d 343, 347 (Va. App. 2009); State v. Lemoine, 831 P.2d 1345 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). While the receiving state exercises jurisdiction over the offender for purposes of supervision, the sending state retains jurisdiction over the offender for purposes of probation or parole revocation. See ICAOS Advisory Opinion 3-2008.

The Compact does not give the receiving state the authority to revoke the probation or parole imposed by authorities in a sending state, nor can a receiving state decide not to provide supervision once the offender transfers in accordance with the ICAOS rules. See Scott v. Virginia supra. at 347; See also, Peppers v. State, 696 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). A receiving state may, independent of the sending state, initiate criminal proceedings against offenders who commit crimes while in the receiving state. See Rule 5.101-1. However, a receiving state may not revoke the probation or parole imposed on the offender by the sending state as part of the offender’s conviction for such crimes. Moreover, whether a sending state continues to exercise jurisdiction over an offender, or has relinquished or forfeited that jurisdiction, is generally a matter that determinable only by the sending state.